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ABSTRACT

The future of space exploration endeavors depends highly on the utilization of insitu resources. Large scale exploration road maps take advantage of local resources to
reduce mission costs and enable the growth of revolutionary self-sufficient technologies
to prolong mission duration and reach beyond current destinations. The major space
treaties included limited provisions on space resource utilization in terms of excavation
and consumption. A natural resource can be extracted from its place of origin with
limited restriction on the quantity and method of use.
To address the risk of ecological damage, resource appropriation, and impending
disputes, claims, and decrees regarding resource utilization, a comprehensive analysis is
performed on the legal doctrines governing activities in outer space, the environmental
protocol of Antarctica, the principles of the high seas, and a case study on resource
appropriation. An analysis of the aforementioned doctrines concludes: 1) the need to
provide an international authority with the power to act when claims and disputes of
international cooperation and consultations fail and 2) the need to establish a protocol on
environmental protection to the Outer Space Treaty to ensure peaceful and orderly
development of our celestial bodies during scientific and commercial activities involving
resource utilization.

ix

PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

Extra-terrestrial exploration is inevitable. As the human race grows, as
technology grows, potential shortages of useful minerals will inspire scientists to seek
alternatives for sustaining the human race and our technological demands. Outer space
provides an array of valuable resources and thus is seen as the next frontier for creating
wealth and sustaining technological demands. To meet demands, nations will rely on the
utilization of outer space in-situ resources to provide efficient, reusable and reliable
sustenance. The primary goals of space exploration are scientific, security, and economic
interests. The idea is not to merely explore our planetary system but to use accessible
space for the benefit of humankind.1 Utilizing space resources for scientific or
technological development will advance and validate capabilities to a point where those
capabilities are available for implementation on future space missions or in technological
developments here on Earth.
Much like the pilgrims of the 1600’s, packing only enough supplies for the trip
across the Atlantic, they relied on the possibility of using local resources in the Americas
to sustain their colony. Imagine what would have become of those explorers if they were
unable to harness the local resources upon their arrival. Fast forward a half of millennia,
1

th

44 Robert H. Goddard Memorial Symposium, “John Marburger Keynote Address,”
http://www.nss.org/resources/library/spacepolicy/marburger1.pdf (accessed October 15, 2011).
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the human race is venturing to Moon, Mars and asteroids. Mankind is continuously
looking for ways to improve longevity of life. If the improvements can be created from
the use of available resources, then mankind will find a way to incorporate them into our
way of life. The quandary is mankind generally focuses on making newer and better
capabilities, but rarely focuses on the effects, whether to the environment or to resource
quantity, until a detrimental event occurs or the discovery of potential shortages in the
supply of a resource is announced. Even then, mankind usually finds another method or
another available resource to replace the capability. For instance, hybrid cars have been
developed as an alternative to gasoline powered vehicles. Although the purpose is to
reduce the consumption rate of oil, a valuable natural resource, the magnets used in the
hybrid car’s motor and generator contain rare elements, which by their name do not exist
in high quantities. The secret to the magnet’s intense field are the three pounds of alloy
made with rare earth elements.2 Now scientists are researching other methods to
compensate for the potential shortages of rare earth elements used not only in hybrid cars
but also in electronics, like iPod ear buds, we use daily. The solution to resource usage is
finding alternative methods, such as resource rationing, to prevent resource depletion and
potential ecological damage. The concern with over usage of resources is a problem not
only on Earth but on celestial bodies. On Earth we can mitigate these problems through
established environmental protection agencies and legal systems to handle disputes when
cooperation and consultation amongst private, government or non-government agencies
fail. In space, these mitigation agencies and systems are not established.

2

Devin Powell, “Sparing the rare earths,” Science News Vol. 180, no. 5 (2011): 18-21.
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The space law principles that have been governing outer space activities for over
45 years do not address the present state of space activities, in which both private and
States Parties are interested in extracting and consuming the natural resources of celestial
bodies for both scientific and commercial purposes. The major space treaties contain
inadequate provisions on the limitations of outer space resource utilization. A State Party
to the space treaties can extract an outer space resource from its place of origin with
limited restriction on the quantity and method of use. For many readers, the limitless use
of outer space resources may not raise a brow. The average person is not concerned with
activities that occur in space, much less the utilization of space resources, until those
activities or usages affect their daily lives here on Earth. If potential shortages of certain
rare Earth elements are arising then the hopes of finding the same element or a
replacement becomes inevitable. Nations will turn to space resources if they can no
longer find a solution here on Earth. Not all have a complete understanding of the untold
riches that lie within the surfaces of our planetary bodies. This dissertation will bring to
light the worldly use of outer space resources, such as Helium-3, europium, tantalum, and
water, and why conservation of these resources is warranted.
In order to ensure peaceful and orderly development of our planetary bodies a
new environmental protocol will be developed through the study of current legal
doctrines to manage, regulate, and facilitate balanced resource extraction. Such a protocol
will establish environmental protection, resource rationing and create an environmental
committee to facilitate and exchange information about environmental issues. Ecological
damage, resource appropriation and impeding disputes/claims from resource utilization

3

are among the few items that will be encountered as we venture beyond Earth without
proper legal doctrines governing the way.

4

PART TWO
RESOURCE INITIATIVES

Visions of exploring beyond Earth’s boundaries were thought of as early as the
2nd Century. A True Story, written by Lucian of Samosata (circa 120-180 CE), is a
science fiction work depicting voyages to the Moon and Venus, extraterrestrial life and
interplanetary war.3 In the 1800s, Konstantin Tsilokovsky envisioned flight outside the
earthly globe and “the need to move farther away from earth and become an independent
planet – a satellite of the sun and a brother of the earth.”4 In 1903 he published “The
Exploration of Cosmic Space by Means of Reaction Devices” where he calculated the
horizontal speed required to leave Earth’s atmosphere and enter space by means of a
rocket.5 “Show me life bigger than the Earth” a common theme behind the visions of
ancient and current space explorers. Before the twenty-first century the competition for
exploration of the Moon and beyond was between two world powers, the Soviet Union
and the United States. Now with the growth and stature of other nations, such as India,
China and Japan, the return to the Moon has become a realistic prospect for many
nations.

3

Overview of Lucian of Samosata, “A True Story by Lucian of Samosata,” Barnes & Nobles website,
http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/a-true-story-by-lucian-of-samosata-lucian-of-samosata/1104697779
(accessed April 15, 2012). Online version of A True Story is available from
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/lucian/true/ (accessed April 15, 2012).
4
Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984), 21.
5
Ibid.

5

As already indicated the future of deep-space missions depends highly on taking
advantage of local resources to enable the capability of self-sufficiency and sustained
human presence in space. As stated supra, on the Moon lies a vast abundance of natural
resources. Some scientists believe natural resources of the Moon and other celestial
bodies will produce better results due to quality and quantity.6 The Moon is rich in
silicon, iron, oxygen, aluminum, hydrogen, helium and other minerals. Figure 1 visually
illustrates the weighted percent of elements found in a typical soil sample taken from the
lunar surface.7 These minerals and volatiles can be used for manufacturing propellants
used in robotic and human vehicles, water production for life support systems, fabrication
of structures, production for a new energy source, and much more. Getting to space is not
cheap. Nations have been witnesses to the exploration budget and have seen the
budgetary shortfalls. Discovering and proving ways to survive and sustain long duration
missions by utilizing in situ resources reduces mission cost by eliminating large amounts
of mass consumed in life support systems, food, propellant, and waste disposal. Taking
advantage of local resources will enable growth of revolutionary self-sufficient
technologies that will prolong mission duration and reach beyond current LEO
destinations.
Before In-situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) can be implemented it’s essential for
nations to invest in resource mapping and site surveying to determine resource location
and quantity availability. In 2008 India launched this effort with their Chandrayyan-1
spacecraft. The mission objectives were to prepare a three-dimensional atlas of the near
6

Fabio Tronchetti, The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and other Celestial Bodies
(Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 2.
7
edited by G.H. Heiken, D. T. Vaniman, and B.M. French, The lunar source book: a user’s guide to the
moon (Cambridge University Press, 1991), CD-ROM, produced by Lunar and Planetary Institute.

6

and far side of the Moon and conduct chemical and mineralogical mapping of the lunar
surface to show elemental distribution.8 One of the many payloads on-board the

Figure 1. Weighted % of elements found in the lunar soil.
CREDIT: Dr. Paul Spudis- www.spudislunarresources.com/

spacecraft was the imaging X-ray spectrometer. This payload’s primary objective was to
determine the presence and abundance of elements on the lunar surface. Results from the
payload showed detection of strong x-ray signals of Silicon, Magnesium, Aluminum,
Calcium and Iron. Another onboard instrument was NASA’s Moon Mineralogy Mapper
(M3) which characterized and mapped the mineral and chemical elements on the Moon
using a push broom imaging spectrometer.9 The instrument collected and combined

8

Chandrayaan-1 scientific objectives, “India’s First Scientific Mission to the Moon,” ISRO website,
http://www.isro.gov.in/Chandrayaan/htmls/objective_scientific.htm (accessed February 20, 2012).
9
NASA’s Moon Mineralogy Mapper, “Instrumentation,” NASA’s JPL website, http://m3.jpl.nasa.gov/
(accessed February 20, 2012).
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spectral coverage in 446-3000 nm, spatial resolution in 70-140 m/pixel, and spectral
resolution in 10-40 nm to create topographical images showing reflectance of the lunar
surface.10 Trace amounts of water-ice were detected at the lunar poles and on certain
craters located near the north and south poles. Figure 2 illustrates the detected water-ice
found near a crater. Figure 3 is a mineral map derived from the spectral signatures. The
image illustrates iron-rich lava flows shown in green, purple and blue and mineral
plagioclase shown in the pink and red regions.

Figure 2. Chandrayaan-1 Moon Mineralogy Mapper. Image on the left shows brightness
at shorter infrared wavelengths. On the right, the water-rich minerals (light blue) are
shown around a crater. Both water- and hydroxyl-rich materials were found to be
associated with material ejected from the crater. CREDIT: ISRO/NASA/JPLCaltech/USGS/Brown Univ.

China is also very active in the research and analysis of lunar resources. In 2007,
China launched the first spacecraft in the series of their lunar mission program, Chang’e1. Change’e-1 mission objectives were aimed at mapping the chemical composition and
abundance of various elements on the lunar surface as part of an evaluation to determine

10

3

3

NASA’s Moon Mineralogy Mapper, “M Overview and Working with M Data,” NASA’s JPL Website,
http://moonmineralogymapper.jpl.nasa.gov/pubs/Isaacson_M3_Workshop_Final.pdf (accessed
December 5, 2011).
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potential useful resources on the Moon.11 One resource of interest was helium-3. A
multi-channel microwave radiometer was developed to gather information about the
brightness temperature of the Moon. The brightness temperature data when combined
with the chemical composition data would be used to obtain the thickness measurement
of lunar regolith layers providing an estimate on resource amounts, such as helium-3.12

Figure 3. NASA’s Moon Mineralogy Mapper from Chandrayyan-1 mission.
Illustrates the various materials found on the near side of the Moon. CREDIT:
ISRO/NASA/JPL-Caltech/Brown Univ./USGS.

Figure 4 illustrates the success Chang’e-1 achieved in mapping and outlining the
distribution of key elements on the Moon. China has launched its second lunar
spacecraft, Chang’e-2, with the objective of returning high resolution images to aid in the
selection of a future landing site for the Chang’e-3 lander and rover mission scheduled in
2017. Chang’e-3 primary mission is to land a rover on the Moon and return to Earth with

11

Sun Huixian, et al., “Scientific objectives and payloads of Chang’E-1 lunar satellite,” J. Earth Syst. Sci 114,
no. 6 (December 2005): 789-794, http://www.ias.ac.in/jessci/dec2005/ilc-25.pdf (accessed January 7,
2012).
12
Ouyang Ziyuan, et al., “Chang’E-1 Lunar Mission: An Overview and Primary Science Results,” Chin. J.
Space Sci. 30 no.5 (2010): 392-403, http://www.cjss.ac.cn/qikan/manage/wenzhang/2010-05-02.pdf
(accessed January 7, 2012).
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lunar soil samples for scientific research.13 As already indicated, many nations have
plans to participate in further exploration of the Moon; among these are the United States,
Russia, Europe, China, Japan, India, Germany, and South Korea. The rising topic of
discussion among nations is commercialization of outer space.

Figure 4. Distribution map of uranium abundance on the Moon.14

The assumption behind commercializing outer space resources is that it will lead to
economic and financial benefits on the Moon and back on Earth. Recent publications, by
Tronchetti15 and Schmitt16, address in detail the commercial benefit on the extraction,
exploitation, and consumption of Helium-3, a rare commodity on Earth but abundant on
the Moon. Helium-3 originates in the Sun and is implanted onto the lunar regolith by
exposure to the solar wind.17 Helium-3 when fused with materials like deuterium can be
used as a fuel in fusion reactors. It has the potential to replace fossil fuels and be the
13

NASA Lunar Science Institute, “Chang’e-2 finishes main mission,”
http://lunarscience.nasa.gov/articles/change-2-finishes-main-mission/ (accessed January 7, 2012).
14
Ouyang Ziyuan, et al., “Chang’E-1 Lunar Mission: An Overview and Primary Science Results,” 392-403.
15
See Fabio Tronchetti, The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 211
16
See Harrison H. Schmidt, Return to the Moon (New York, NY: Praxis Publishing, 2006).
17
edited by G.H. Heiken, D. T. Vaniman, and B.M. French, The lunar source book: a user’s guide to the
moon, 686
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primary source of energy on Earth. Schmitt18 depicts the energy savings and value of
helium-3:
Detailed analyses of lunar soil samples and other evidence indicate that helium-3
concentrations are probably between 20 and 30 parts per billion in undisturbed,
titanium-rich soils….the value of helium-3 relative to the probably energy
equivalent value of coal in 2010-2020-estimated conservatively at $2.50 per
million BTU – will be almost $40,000 per ounce! At $40,000 per ounce, 100
kilograms of helium-3 would be worth about $140 million. One hundred
kilograms constitutes enough fuel to power 1000-megawatt electric plant for a
year when fused with deuterium…..A plant of that capacity will fill the needs of a
city about the size of Dallas for about one year.
There are other essential minerals on the lunar surface that would serve in sustaining
human presence in space. An oxide mineral known as ilmenite (FeTiO3) is an important
constituent of lunar rock. This mineral can be found in the lunar mare basalts and can
provide TiO2, Fe and O through chemical reduction. TiO2 can be used as a refractory, the
Fe for materials fabrication and the O for life support and rocket propellants.19 Other
notable minerals found on the lunar surface that may be used for production purposes are
aluminum, iron, and hydrogen. Outer space in general is abundant in resources.
According to John S. Lewis the per capita income in using asteroidal iron and steel would
generate wealth in the neighborhood of $7 Billion per person.20 Add this to the gold,
silver, and uranium deposits found in the asteroid belt; that number could reach as high as
$100 Billion per person.21 The idea of creating wealth by opening new and previously
unforeseen markets with outer space resources is thriving in the minds of both the private
and government industry. In the United States, NASA recently published a series of

18

Harrison H. Schmitt, Return to the Moon, 44
edited by G.H. Heiken, D. T. Vaniman, and B.M. French, The lunar source book: a user’s guide to the
moon, 209
20
Virgiliu Pop, Who owns the Moon? Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and Mineral Resources Ownership
(Space Regulations Library Vol. 4: Springer, 2008), 24
21
Ibid.
19
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Human Exploration Destination Maps revealing new technological developments and
demonstrations with ISRU capabilities.22 Technology demonstrations include water
extraction from the Moon’s surface for use in habitats, vehicle systems, and waste
removal. Another example is regolith manipulation and solidification schemes for shield
protection against cosmic radiation. Another is food augmentation through an integrated
environmental control and life support system. Many of the proposed technologies lead
the path toward improving living conditions in space. Furthermore, the road maps have
identified devices that will mine and drill into planetary surfaces in order to extract
minerals for further characterization to determine their usefulness in creating
infrastructure, utility/functionality, comfort, and safety.
Future missions have been outlined in NASA’s budget, such as the precursor
mission xPRM Lunar Lander scheduled to deploy in 2016.23 Its primary mission is to
demonstrate the extraction of water and other materials from the lunar surface to prove
the production of propellants is achievable through the use of lunar resources. As
mentioned above, China in 2017 will be extracting lunar material for their scientific
research. So much of space exploration hinges on the ability to propel vessels, explorers
and their cargo in the most cost effective and efficient way. Propellant resources on
Earth are limited and expensive given the shear weight of the system being launched.
Resources on the Moon can be extracted and refined to provide the sufficient sustenance
and propellant for explorers to reach beyond the Moon. John Marburger, former
22

NASA Space Technology Roadmap, “TA-07 Human Exploration Destination Systems,” NASA website,
http://www.nasa.gov/offices/oct/home/roadmaps/index.html (accessed October 15, 2011).
23
NASA Exploration Enterprise Workshop, “FY 2011 Exploration Precursor Robotic Missions (xPRM) Point
of Departure Plans, NASA website,
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/457443main_EEWS_ExplorationsPrecursorRoboticMissions.pdf (accessed
October 15, 2011).

12

presidential scientist advisor, who headed the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
is well-known for the speech he gave at the 2006 Goddard Memorial Symposium, “[t]he
greatest value of the Moon lies neither in science nor in exploration, but in its material.”24
It is well recognized in the space industry that extracting elements from the lunar surface
and processing them into “fuel or massive components of space apparatus”, as stated by
Marburger, has a tremendous cost advantage over objects launched from Earth.
ISRU may begin as a State operated activity in order prove and verify the
capabilities work, but in the end the use of ISRU will become a commercial activity
where private industries will want to exploit the resources to make a profit in outer space
and back on Earth. With the growth of nation’s exploration potentials, the need to
establish a framework on environmental protection becomes evident. The moon and other
planetary bodies have an abundance of resources to avail one of, but “Who owns the
rights to those resources?” and “What laws are in place to regulate the consumption and
extraction of those resources?” If commercialization is allowed, and resource extraction
can begin on the lunar surface, asteroids or other planetary bodies without a legal
framework to guide their methods and consumption, then the planetary bodies that once
looked so promising will become devoid.
Resource monitoring and availability is the key in accomplishing the
advancement of the quality of life on Earth and in reaching the goal of sustaining human
presence in outer space. The failure to protect the environment from extraction and
consumption of space resources will lead to terrestrial disruption, depletion of non-

24

th

44 Robert H. Goddard Memorial Symposium, “John Marburger Keynote Address,”
http://www.nss.org/resources/library/spacepolicy/marburger1.pdf (accessed October 15, 2011).
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replenishing resources, a first come and first serve mentality toward the use of resources,
and a risk to international peace and political fairness amongst all. If exploring beyond
LEO is truly the objective then the management of resource extraction and consumption
is necessary.

14

PART THREE
METHODOLOGY

3.1

Introduction
In the paragraphs to follow, a comprehensive analysis is performed on the Outer

Space Treaty (OST), the Moon Agreement (MA), the Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, principles of the high seas, the structure of the
International Court of Justice, and a case study on resource appropriation. The analysis of
these doctrines will identify the legal provisions governing resource extraction and
consumption and to discover which elements of these doctrines can be used in developing
an environmental protocol to manage, regulate, and facilitate balanced resource
extraction in outer space. Through judicious analysis the following statements make a
claim on the existing issues discovered in the space law system of which this thesis will
convey and contend in detail:
1. The provisions of the OST and MA provide limited safeguarding on the
extraction and consumption of outer space resources.
2. From a Private and State prospective, planetary bodies, such as the Moon,
are seen as a source of profit from the potentially valuable minerals;
therefore they are targets for resource utilization.

15

3. There is a need to develop an environmental protocol that will protect
terrestrial disruption, potential depletion of non-replenishing resources,
ownership and control (first come, first serve) of extracted resources, and
will safeguard international peace and political fairness among all.
Before diving into the laws that govern the use and exploration of outer space
there are a couple of terms that need defining. The privatization and commercialization
of space have been used interchangeably through many space policy publications. In the
case of defining privatization and commercialization one may have to look to the context
around the ideology and background imbue on it. For the purposes of this paper the
definitions described by von der Dunk25 will apply:
“private” refers to the legal classification of an actor undertaking a space activity
as oppose to “public” which comprises governments, governmental agencies, and
intergovernmental organizations, and “commercial” refers to the main driving
factor behind, and overarching objective of, such an activity and hence, is to
contrasted to such other objectives as military or scientific purposes.
Also, for the intent of this paper the terms “use” and “ownership”, as they apply to
extraterrestrial declarations on space resources, need further clarification. The term “use”
applies to the common property of all who can enjoy it, whereas, the term “ownership”
applies to appropriation of common property by claim of sovereignty. Use does not mean
own unless there is a clear act of total possession or complete depletion. Total
consumption of a resource must never occur as it would mean ownership and would be
counter Articles II and IX of the OST.26 There are arguments in favor of the right to
exploit a resource without having to claim ownership. These arguments come from the
25

Frans G. von der Dunk, “The Moon Agreement and the Prospect of Commercial Exploitation of Lunar
Resources,” Annals of Air and Space Law Vol. XXXII (2007): 93.
26
Virgiliu Pop, Who owns the Moon? Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and Mineral Resources Ownership,
138
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lack of provisions on a resource once the resource has been extracted from its place of
origin. In order to claim ownership of a resource, there must be a legal right to use,
possess and give away said property. Since the space treaties do not provide a legal right
to own extracted resources then the legality of whether exploitation means ownership
cannot be disputed without the creation of a third definition not yet provided by space
doctrines. Many of the legal doctrines contain vague content and do not outline the
specifics behind their terminology. A closer look at the doctrines will unveil that most of
the provisions are very general in nature and undefined terms result in broad
interpretations of States Parties.
It is necessary to briefly mention the history behind the foundation of these legal
doctrines. The Antarctic Treaty System, the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Agreement
were written post World War II between the times of 1959 and 1979. The avoidance of
conflict (a priori) became the central theme in the post-bellum international law.27 The
United Nations Charter was in charge of removing any threats to the peace. “Areas that
would have normally been considered terra nullius (Moon, deep seabed) or where
conflicting claims could have grown into full-fledge wars (Antarctica) became, over the
years, objects of international treaties.”28 Statements within the preambles of the OST,
Antarctic Treaty, and MA explicitly call attention to maintaining international peace so as
to send a clear message to the international community to conduct scientific and
exploration needs in a peaceful manner. The preamble of the Antarctic Treaty recognizes
“it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used

27

Virgiliu Pop, Who owns the Moon? Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and Mineral Resources Ownership,
60
28
Ibid.
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exclusively for peaceful purpose and shall not become the scene or object of international
discord” 29 and the MA declares the desire “to prevent the Moon from becoming an area
of international conflict.”30 Maintaining international peace drove the warrant of free
access to all areas and removed the technical difficulties that would be encountered in
establishing title and delineating boundaries.31 The notion of instituting free access to all
areas of space became the driver behind the non-appropriation principle32 and as a result
of the principle an object or territory in outer space is not subject to private ownership or
transaction but it is open to all. Tronchetti provides a detailed view on how the term res
communis omnium was supported by legal institutions and the problems faced in
characterizing the legal status of outer space.33 The declarations proclaimed in the
preambles of the OST and MA make clear the desire to keep outer space and the celestial
bodies from becoming a place of international conflict. The concern is determining how
to avoid international conflict while allowing States Parties the right to derive potential
benefits from utilizing the natural resources found on the Moon and other celestial
bodies. Given the rise in private ventures into outer space along with support for
commercial spaceflight industry, a set of provisions that will protect the space
environment and its resources should be clearly delineated.
The question has often been raised whether there is a need to amend the
provisions of the OST to permit space-faring nations and private operators rights to
29

See Preamble to the Antarctic Treaty, available at the following website:
http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/treaty/update_1959.php
30
See Preamble to the Moon Agreement, available at the following website:
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/gares/html/gares_34_0068.html
31
Ibid.
32
See Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, available at the following website:
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html
33
Fabio Tronchetti, The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 12-14
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perform exploitation of extraterrestrial resources. There is a commercial advantage for
using outer space resources in terms of exploitation.34 Tronchetti argues exploitation will
contribute to the betterment of living conditions on Earth.35 Tronchetti also argues the
industrial, financial, and political interests that would result from such exploitation
activities. These interests would require a new legal framework to preserve the validity of
the current space law regime while establishing provisions to govern the exploitation of
natural resources.36 The International Institute of Space Law even identified current
international space legislation does not include detailed provisions with regard to the
exploitation of natural resources of outer space, the Moon or other celestial bodies and
provided their view that a specific legal regime for exploitation of space resources should
be elaborated through the United Nations for the purposes of clarity and legal certainty in
the near future.37 The argument of this paper is that before one can establish provisions
to govern exploitation activities there must first be provisions on environmental
protection that includes balanced resource extraction and consumption. As each of the
doctrines mentioned above are analyzed, it will become evident that there is a breakdown
in the current space law framework for governing extraction and consumption of space
resources and there is a need to manage these resources before exploitation and
consumption begin.
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3.2

Outer Space Treaty
In space law, the most recognized legal document governing the exploration and

use of outer space is the OST.38 It is made up of seventeen articles broadly addressing
the subject of sovereignty, exploration, use, militarization, liability, and conflict in outer
space and on celestial bodies. The treaty is the most widely accepted among all of the
outer space treaties. The notion that activities in space should remain in full harmony and
adhere to certain international obligations led to the creation of the OST which entered
into force in 1967. The realization of the warranted need came from the excitement of the
Sputnik flight and the awareness that international cooperation was essential if
uncontrolled activities and chaotic developments in space were to be avoided. The
treaties underlying principles are as follows:
1. Exploration and ‘use’ of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all
countries
2. Outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all states on a basis of
equality
3. Outer space shall not be subject to appropriation by claim of sovereignty,
by means of occupation, or by any other means
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4. Activities in exploration and use of outer space must be carried out in
accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security
5. No nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction
shall be placed in orbit around Earth
6. Consultations may take place in the event of dangerous activities in space
For principles describing the international responsibility for the protection of the
environmental and management of outer space resources a review of a few OST Articles
(I, II, VI, and IX) should prove instructive.
Article I
Article I addresses three basic rights: the right of free access, the right of free
exploration and the right of free use. Article I declares that:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be
the province of all mankind. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination
of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and
there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be freedom of
scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such
investigation.
In the first sentence “Province of all mankind” prescribes that the exploration and use of
outer space must be carried out for the benefit and interest of all countries, irrespective to
their degree of economic or scientific development. This sentence represents an
obligation to developed States to ensure any activities, whether exploring the land or
21

using space resources, be performed in a manner that benefits all countries, regardless of
their status quo in being a space-faring nation. Developing countries are protected
through the idea of space exploration and use being conducted “for the benefit” and “in
the interest” of all mankind.39 The Article testifies that though all nations have a
common stake in resources found off Earth only a few are in a position to make use of
them.40 This principle takes into account not only the needs and rights of the States
directly involved in space activities but also those of all mankind.41 Some scholars
interpret the concept as just a moral obligation without imposing any legal obligation to
those developing countries that may never use or explore outer space.42 To what extent is
a State Party obligated to share the benefits of their space activities? It should be noted
that developing States played an important role during the drafting of this treaty. The
insertion of “irrespective of their degree and scientific development” was the result of a
Brazil representative.43 Though the intent to of taking into account all needs and rights of
States is clear what is unclear are the details of how a developing State or even a spacefaring State would receive the benefits prescribed by another State. For example, what if
a state extracted helium-3 from the Moon’s surface and exploited the mineral back on
Earth to provide a renewed energy source for electrical power production. Would the
country that extracted and exploited helium-3 be obligated to share the enormous profit it
collected? Or did the country meet its obligation of the treaty by providing the benefit of
a renewed energy source to all States? According to the article all countries are to
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receive the benefit, but there is a possibility for only one country to receive the profit.
Who or what manages the States Parties that would exploit and consume outer space
resources without due regard to resource rationing and turn an unmanaged and
ungoverned frontier into a profit.
Article I (2) affirms the Moon and celestial bodies shall be “free for exploration
and use by all States”; the term ‘use’ causes great controversy over the types of activities
that can be performed in space. The term ‘explore’ refers to the research and scientific
activities performed within the space environment. It is the term ‘use’ that is general and
open to interpretation. Use can be defined as a scientific or commercial activity. While
there are no disputes over the former, there is a great difference of opinion concerning the
latter. Some States Parties to the treaty, such as France, view the term ‘use’ as equivalent
to ‘exploitation.’44 Replace the term ‘use’ with ‘exploit’ in Article 1 (2) and it can be
interpreted that all states have the right to exploit the land in space without discrimination
of any kind but on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law. The
thought of allowing exploitation on these terms brings to mind a TV series known as
Firefly.45 Firefly illustrates one person’s idea of what would happen if we colonized
another solar system. One entity controls all aspects of outer space. The vision is
technology will advance but under the same political, moral and ethical problems as we
have today. The main character is a smuggler who looks for honest labor but cannot, do
to equality of all man. There is a shortage of food and medical supplies. The series
portrays the outcome of what would happen when one State is given the right to mine and
44
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exploit but only on the basis of equality. The concept implies all States would have the
right to mine. How does one equally share the freedom to explore and ‘use’ outer space
amongst all State Parties? The paragraph goes on to say “there should be free access to
all areas of celestial bodies.” What if two State Parties want to ‘use’ or ‘exploit’ the same
area? How do you resolve that conflict?
Article 1 (3) provides freedom of scientific investigation on all celestial bodies.
It’s interesting this last paragraph exists. If ‘explore’ refers to freedom of research and
scientific activities as stated above, then technically this last paragraph is already covered
by the second paragraph of the article. Why would the right of freedom for scientific
investigation need to be re-stated, unless the purpose of the second paragraph is really to
allow activities, like exploitation resulting in a need to establish the right of freedom for
scientific investigation? However, the additional paragraph may be to re-establish the
intent behind the types of space activities allowed. Regardless, the terms are vague and
clarification is needed.
In summary, Article I sets the right of free access to explore, use and perform
scientific investigations on any area of a celestial body. However, the article fails to
provide clear specifics on the term ‘use’ and if the term encompasses exploitation, the
sharing of areas prone to activity, management of products derived from those activities,
limitations on the amounts of product extracted or consumed, and the creation of an
authority in charge with the power to resolve conflict when it arises. There is also no
environmental protocol on monitoring these activities to discern if an activity will cause
harm to a State or another State’s activity, the environment of a celestial body, or to
personnel residing on the Moon.
24

Article II
Like Article I, Article II embodies an essential principle of space law by defining
the legal status of outer space and a basis for all manned activities in the realm of space
located approximately 100 km above sea level. Article II states the non-appropriation
principle of outer space and celestial bodies. The viewpoint on non-appropriation began
back in 1960. From 1960 to 1966, the Association of the Bar of the city of New York, the
Institute of International Law, and the International Institute of Space Law had either
recommended or drafted a statement that stated “Celestial bodies…shall not be subject to
national appropriation by any person, organization, or State on Earth.”46 Article II reads,
“Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.” The Article reinstates the res communis omnium character, that is, outer space is
free access open to all and cannot be owned by anyone, not even a State. The term res
communis omnium is derived from the Roman law and applies to areas such as air and
light.47 Virgiliu Pop argues the OST has conferred outer space with the character of “res
communis – placed by nature at the equal disposal of all men and non-appropriable by
individual States or private persons.”48 The drafters of the Article make it clear that a
terrestrial claim in outer space is not allowed. The general consensus among the drafters
of the Treaty was to preserve the peaceful nature of the space environmental and ensure
all mankind had free access, exploration and use, without discrimination of any kind.

46

Virgiliu Pop, Who owns the Moon? Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and Mineral Resources Ownership,
64
47
Fabio Tronchetti, The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 11
48
Virgiliu Pop, Who owns the Moon? Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and Mineral Resources Ownership,
quotes David S. Myers, 65.

25

It is necessary to discuss if appropriation by claim of sovereignty refers to land
(property on the surface) or to the extraterrestrial material under the surfaces. In view of
the drafters of the Treaty, the idea of movable extracted resources was not thought of and
so it’s really not out of character that the OST does not directly address the appropriation
of extracted resources. Pop argues certain viewpoints that could be implied since
appropriation of extraterrestrial materials is not directly stated. One viewpoint stated by
Pop is the OST prohibits appropriation of extraterrestrial material because the OST does
not distinguish between celestial bodies and their resources and instead enounces only
one legal regime prohibiting national appropriation.49 On the same viewpoint another
scholar argues that if the exploration and use of outer space is to be in the interest and
benefit of all mankind and not for the benefit of a single State, then any resource
extracted has to be used exclusively in the interest and benefit of all mankind. However,
it would be difficult to extract material away from a particular State because that State
would argue their use of such material coincides with the interest of mankind.50 The
second viewpoint Pop argues is the OST allows appropriation on limited quantities of
extraterrestrial material because such quantities are required in scientific experiments,
operation needs of local outposts, and in scientific testing back on Earth.51 The later
example has already been seen by the Apollo missions when astronauts brought back
regolith and rock samples for scientific analysis. These examples would fall under the
freedom of scientific investigation provided by the Article I of OST. The third viewpoint
Pop argues is the OST allows appropriation merely because Article II doesn’t specifically
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state non-appropriation of materials thereon. The seizure of materials merely lies within
the freedom of exploration and use of outer space as stated by Article I of the OST.
One scholar argues enterprise rights falls into the category of the right to explore
and exploit outer space resources without having to claim ownership over the land
thereof.52 On the same viewpoint Pop53 quotes a scholar, who found it appropriate to cite
the play Rudens by Titus Maccius Plautus:
[W]hen the slave says: - the sea is certainly common to all persons – the
fisherman agrees; but when the slave adds: - then what is found in the common
sea is common property – he rightly objects, saying: - But what my net and hooks
have taken, is absolutely my own.
The common theme behind each of these viewpoints is that outer space resources will be
extracted and used in some form or fashion. The right of who owns those resources is still
debatable. Until the OST can be updated to address clarity and legal certainty of the term
‘use’ then the right of using outer space resources for exploitation or scientific
investigation is valid option open to all States.
Another factor that needs further consideration is when the use of space resources
results in ownership of those resources. If a State has the freedom of scientific
investigation, as stated by Article I, but any attempt to claim ownership of a part is
forbidden by Article II, then at what point does freedom of scientific investigation turn
into ownership of parts? Say a State Party collects lunar regolith to build a shield over a
lunar outpost to protect its inhabitants from the effects of radiation exposure. Most
scientists are aware of the need to protect astronauts from the extreme radiation
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environment on the lunar surface.54 One way to reduce the amount of exposure is to dig
beneath the lunar surface and build an outpost covered in lunar regolith. Studies show
about 1-2 meters of regolith is needed for effective shielding.55 Although there is a lot of
lunar regolith available on the lunar surface, the 1-2 meters utilized by a State is no
longer available to any other State, thus proving resource ownership. Another example is
using a space resource for local needs. If a State is to be successful in sustaining human
presence on the Moon then it needs a life support system. A life support system provides
astronauts with food, water and air. Water, like food, is a heavy element on a spacecraft
payload. Finding ways to eliminate large amounts of mass is essential in reducing
mission costs. The Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS)56 and M3
missions confirm the presence of water ice on the lunar surface. In order for the water ice
to be used in a life support system for food, drinking, and hygiene purposes, the metallic
minerals contained within the water ice would need to be removed. Once the water ice is
altered and consumed within a life support system, then technically only one State has
access to the resource unless the outpost bears the same international operations of the
International Space Station. Depending on the amount of water ice available, what
system is in place to ensure the resource is divided fairly among all States? What system
is in place to manage the rate of quantity consumed versus quantity remaining? What
about protecting the scientific data that is locked away in the micro and macro minerallogical level of the Moon?
54
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It should be clarified that this principle also covers sovereignty claims to the
space surrounding a celestial body. Like in most contracts when terms are vague and
open to broad interpretations someone finds a way out. Variations of sovereignty can
already be seen in space activities like remote sensing, telecommunications, and
permanent constructions of settlements. A satellite occupies a set orbit space for an
extended period of time. During the period of contract no other satellite can have that
space, so technically the company or organization of that satellite claims control over the
said space for a period of time which results in a form of sovereignty. Most of mankind
looks for loopholes in laws governing the activities they wish to partake in and thereby
the natural tendencies of mankind justifies the need to establish clear and distinct
guidelines.
Article IX
It has already been established in the paragraph above the OST does not
adequately provide provisions on the extraction and consumption of outer space
resources. This non-establishment of guidelines directly hinders the ability to protect the
environment housing those resources. There is no reason why States Parties using and
exploring outer space cannot establish a set of guidelines that adopt an environmental
protocol aimed at achieving global responsibility for the activities performed in outer
space. Most space activities have been about national prestige, not planetary
responsibility.57 Space debris is one of the greatest hazards facing human activities in
outer space. Technical studies and analyses on legal and policy implications to determine
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a better international regime for recognizing and regulating space debris started before
1989.58 Today the States Parties to the OST still remain unresponsive on providing
environmental guidelines for space activities. Pitfalls experienced from not updating the
space treaty, as it pertains to space debris, prove that by not establishing a clear
framework for environmental protection of space resources we are heading for similar
challenges. Establishing legal rules for environmental protection will increase State’s
understanding on the nature of ecological systems and promote awareness to
environmental impact. Lunar and celestial economic development is the future for space
exploration. The conception of man as a steward tending to the environment is essential
in protecting the environment on a universal scale for future generations.59 Activities in
outer space have been conducted by men for over 50 years now. Planetary relationships,
such as the Earth-Moon system, are essential to the existence of life on Earth. Can man
afford to ignore the Earthly history lessons in resource preservation and the safe keeping
of the environment? The one Article of the OST that addresses some limitations on space
activities for the safeguarding of the environment is Article IX. This article will be
examined in detail, Article IX states:
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation
and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the
corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to
the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful
contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting
from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt
appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to
believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space,
58
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including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful
interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall
undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such
activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe
that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful
interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation
concerning the activity or experiment.
The history of this Article is worth mentioning because the activities occurring in
space during the time of its creation played an influential role on the drafters of this
treaty. The question of harming the outer space environment through space activities
began after the launch of Sputnik I.60 A question was put forward on whether “early
exploration attempts or ill-considered experiments might result in biological, chemical or
radiological contamination of lunar or planetary surfaces such as to complicate or render
impossible further studies of scientific importance.”61 Two committees were formed to
protect the newly founded space environment from harmful experiments, first the
Committee on Contamination by Extraterrestrial Exploration (CETEX), disbanded in
1959, and then the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR).62 According to Baker’s
assessment, the two committees were only concerned with the effects of contamination
and environmental interference as it would pertain to damaging other scientific activities.
As such the committees gave no consideration on whether scientific space research and
experiments would pose as a hazard to the outer space environment.63 Baker perceives
the committee’s approach as a “sci-lab” viewpoint:
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the view that the value of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, is limited to its use as a laboratory for scientific activity and that any
proposed space activity will be assessed as potentially harmful to the outer space
environment if and only if it threatens the future use of outer space for scientific
purposes. 64
This “sci-lab” viewpoint made its way into the wording of Article IX. The viewpoint can
be seen in Article IX (1) and (3), “States Parties……shall conduct all their activities in
outer space….with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States
Parties…”, and “If a State Party….has reason to believe that an activity or
experiment…..would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of another
State Party….it should undertake appropriate international consultation…” The
provisions within these two sentences are directed towards activities performed by the
States and their potential to harm other States Parties research activities. Neither
sentence provides restrictions on space activities that could cause potential harm to the
space environment. It was not until seven months before the treaty was open for
signatures that US President Lyndon B. Johnson proposed the treaty be updated to
include a principle about avoiding harmful contamination while performing activities in
space.65 Both the US and USSR submitted draft proposals on Article IX including
provisions about avoiding harmful contamination of the celestial bodies. The fact both
draft proposals included a common principle of avoidance of contamination and the
declaration made by President Johnson to include such a provision are the reasons why
Article IX now includes provisions about avoiding harmful contamination of celestial
bodies. Article IX (2) and (4) state, “State Parties…shall pursue studies of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to
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avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of
Earth…” and “A State Party which has reason to believe that an activity of
experiment……would cause potentially harmful interference with activities…including
the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or
experiment.”
Though this one article contains many provisions on performing scientific
activities in space it is imperative to disclose what it does not say about the management
of outer space resources. There are many benefits that come from using outer space, to
name a few, remote sensing, satellite television, wireless communications, and unmanned
exploration missions. It is the side effects from these activities like pollution and foreign
object debris that have an adverse impact on the space environment. The term “so as to
avoid” harmful contamination in the second sentence of the article really offers no direct
protection for the environment. No activity is banned, only avoided, thereby allowing for
harmful contamination by default. The sentence provides no preventative measures on
how to avoid producing contamination, no clear definition on what would constitutes as
contamination, nor does it provide a course of action for cleaning up contamination that
may result from an activity. Looking further into Article IX (2), the adjective used to
describe contamination differs on location: “Harmful contamination” to be avoided on
celestial bodies, while “adverse changes” are to be avoided on Earth resulting from the
introduction of extraterrestrial matter.66 By using a different expression for Earth’s
location would imply harmful contamination may be permitted to enter Earth. Adverse
changes may not necessarily constitute harmful contamination; such an example is
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provided by Baker: “The importation to Earth of an extraterrestrial organism, which
results from harmful contamination, would be permissible as long as adverse changes of
Earth’s environment do not occur.”67 So, the importation of an extraterrestrial organism
that releases a virus and affects certain humans would be permissible because it did not
adversely change the Earth’s environment (e.g., evaporation of a continental water
supply). The allowance of certain activities without proper environmental guidelines
leaves open the door to certain ill-fated damages that may not be reversed. What is
missing from this article is a committee in charge of performing environmental impact
assessments of activities before allowing them to proceed.
The article does not mandate, it implies, the need to have “due regard” to other
parties partaking in activities in outer space. The movement of dust, mining, or release of
hazardous materials may affect the activities of other State Parties. For example, if a State
Party builds a large Radio telescope on the far side of the Moon to avoid electromagnetic
interference created on Earth, how do they stop other State Parties from building on the
near side and contaminating the RF spectrum? The consensus to perform an activity is
not required before proceeding. Now, the Japanese delegation had suggested an
amendment to include more detailed regulation of ‘contamination’ but it was rejected.68
During the drafting of OST the intent was not to establish too rigid procedures which
might hinder future research or limit their space activities.69 An establishment of
environmental principles would have prohibited or limited such activities, especially if
those activities harmed the celestial body and its surrounding space environment.
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However, it is evident during the drafting of the OST the rules governing environmental
protection were based on laws of man and not laws of nature as interpreted by
scientists.70
Article IX (3) and (4) provide general provisions about consulting with other
States Parties should there be a “reason to believe” an activity or experiment would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities of another State Party or with activities in
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Article IX (4) provides no obligation for
the State undertaking the activity to agree to the request for consultation, it simply states
a State Party “may request” consultation. The procedures on how to begin consultation or
an authority to overhear said arguments and provide a resolution is not provided by this
article or by OST. If a State Party is at fault for pursing a potentially harmful activity –
which is based on the premise of sufficient knowledge, then what appropriate measures
would be taken? According to this article and the OST there is no obligation for a State to
oblige with the resolution of the consultation. States could apply to dispute a resolution
under international law; however, there are no procedures in place to invoke Earth-bound
resolution of outer space disputes. Below is an example of a dispute based on the drive
shown by commercial entities to reach space for exploitation. If a State Party decides to
strip mine He-3 on the lunar surface creating a gigantic electrostatic dust cloud which
settles on another State Parties optical telescope, how do the two State Parties facilitate
their differences? What if their difference cannot be worked out? What authority is in
charge to hear and resolve their conflict? Currently, such an international authority does
not exist. Now, if an environmental committee had been established by the OST then the
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two State Parties would have been aware of the activity and an impact assessment would
have been performed before allowing such an activity to take place. The goal of this
paper is to provide recommendations on the principles of such a committee.71 Later, the
need to establish an international authority will be discussed as well as the work that has
already been done by the space community to create such an authority.
3.3

Moon Agreement
The Moon Agreement governs the activities of States on the Moon and other

celestial bodies. The Preamble of the agreement recognizes that the Moon and other
celestial bodies have important roles in the exploration of outer space.72 The desire of the
agreement is to prevent the Moon from becoming an area of international conflict while
promoting further progress in the development and use of the Moon and other celestial
bodies. The MA was created to provide additional detailed provisions for man’s activities
on celestial bodies.73 The agreement elaborates on environmental protection and bears in
mind the benefits which may be derived from the exploitation of the natural resources.
Awareness on what types of activities could be performed on the Moon and other
celestial bodies became known in the course of the successful Moon landings performed
by the United States from 1969 to 1972. Unlike the general provisions in the OST used to
account for exploration and use of celestial bodies, the MA speaks to the awareness of a
State’s willingness to perform activities such as exploitation and the need to define and
develop provisions relating to the exploration and use of outer space resources. The
71
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drafting of the MA began in 1970 and continued for the next eight years as State Parties
deliberated on the wording.74 On December 18, 1979 the agreement had received
approval and was open for signatures, and on July 11, 1984 the agreement entered into
force. Surprisingly, after many years of deliberating only a hand full of States ratified the
agreement.75 As of 2011 only thirteen States have ratified the agreement, with an
additional four States being signatories to it. The agreement has not been ratified by any
nation which engages in self-launched manned exploration missions or has plans to do so.
The following space-faring nations have not signed the agreement: the United States,
United Kingdom, Russia, Europe, China, and Japan. France and India signed but did not
ratify the agreement. This level of acceptance makes the binding force of the MA
unsuccessful. While the agreement may not be binding to all State Party’s, it does
introduce new elements on exploitation which will have a practical impact on space
activities performed on the Moon or other celestial bodies. Though the MA is deemed
unsuccessful there are some legal scholars analyzing its provisions for the purpose of
developing a new legal regime which allows private operators to exploit the natural
resources found on the Moon and other celestial bodies for commercial purposes.76 Even
though the MA is not binding to the current space-faring nations it is still an in-force
agreement and an important doctrine of space law. Articles 6, 7, 11 and 15 will be
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analyzed for the content relating to safeguarding on extraction and consumption of outer
space resources.77
Article 6
Much of the MA is an elaboration from the OST so certain articles will contain
similar wording. Only the new rules and elements will be analyzed within the Articles
stated above. Article 6 declares:
1. There shall be freedom of scientific investigation on the moon by all States
Parties without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in
accordance with international law.
2. In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of the provisions of
this Agreement, the States Parties shall have the right to collect on and remove
from the moon samples of its mineral and other substances. Such samples shall
remain at the disposal of those States Parties which caused them to be collected
and may be used by them for scientific purposes. States Parties shall have
regard to the desirability of making a portion of such samples available to other
interested States Parties and the international scientific community for
scientific investigation. States Parties may in the course of scientific
investigations also use mineral and other substances of the moon in quantities
appropriate for the support of their missions.
3. States Parties agree on the desirability of exchanging scientific and other
personnel on expeditions to or installations on the moon to the greatest extent
feasible and practicable.

Unlike the OST, Article 6 (2) of the MA allows States Parties to collect and remove
samples of minerals and other substances from a celestial body. The article goes on to
declare that States Parties shall have “regard” in making a portion of such samples
available to other interested States Parties and the international scientific community. In
actuality, States Parties could decline to allocate portions of the collected samples as the
article does not stipulate States Parties “shall share” such portions. This sentence
77
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essential allows a State Party to the Treaty to remove a natural resource from a celestial
body with no obligation to share the resource. Furthermore, Article 6 (2) affirms States
Parties, in the course of scientific investigations, are allowed to take “quantities
appropriate” for the support of their mission(s). Some legal scholars feel the “quantitative
assessment [should be] at the sole appreciation of the States conducting the mission” and
the “use of in-situ resources is determinable by the mission definition or mission profile,
defining its purposes and objectives.”78 If the latter is true then this Article does not
provide any limitation on the amount of material a State Party can remove. A States
Parties could deem the excessive removal of a mineral is required to successfully
complete their mission profile. Recall the OST has not established an international
authority to govern the extraction or consumption of space resources and since major
space-faring nations have not signed the MA, then there is no reprimand or power of
authority to act if a State Party chooses not to share a resource or takes too much of a
resource leaving little behind for the next Party.
Regardless of the efforts put forth by a State Party or what the mission profile
prescribes, a State Party should not be able to remove infinite amounts of extraterrestrial
resources. Clear cutting timber in the U.S. and the resulting dust bowl are two prime
examples of environmental disasters that resulted from unchecked limits on resource
usage. The entrepreneurial spirit unleashed in the minds of the lumbermen, following the
California gold rush, led to a new industrial era in forest exploitation which left behind
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waste and land destruction, leading to timber depletion and deforestation.79 In 1850, the
first lumber business opened and by 1930 deforestation could be seen on the Pacific
coast.80 In 1940, Oregon’s Forest Conservation Act became law and mandated operators
“to leave reserve trees of commercial species deemed adequate under normal conditions
to maintain continuous forest growth and/or provide satisfactory restocking to ensure
future forest growth.”81 This idea of resource rationing has not been implemented in the
OST or MA.
On April 14, 1935, known as Black Sunday, massive dust storms occurred across
a 97 million acre section that extended to Colorado, New Mexico, Kansas, Texas and
Oklahoma.82 The cause of the 1930s Dust Bowl was largely due to the severity of the
climate, the type of soil, and excessive cultivation of land that was intended for grazing.83
Farmers continuously cultivated the land without allowing proper topsoil regeneration
time. Consider the perfect storm; no trees existed to block the wind, with the only root
system holding the dirt together gone and no rain, the slightest breath of wind altered the
face of that area for years. The Dust Bowl is an example of what happens when resource
extraction goes unchecked. The U.S. Government responded by implementing a program
to conserve soil and restore ecological balance, the program Soil Conversation Service
was formed in 1935 later renamed to the Natural Resource Conservation Service
(NRCS). Again this idea of resource conservation has not been implemented in the MA
or OST.
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If an abundant resource goes unchecked it will soon become scarce and may
cause erratic environmental damages. The ambiguity of the term ‘quantities appropriate’
in Article 6 (2) provides no discrete limitation on the amount of material a State Party
may remove. With no regulation on set quantities for resource removal the Moon will
become a dwelling for unethical harvesting of space resources. The design, development
and performance of space exploration activities are derived from documented lessons
learned on previous missions to ensure those types of problems are not recreated. This
methodology should be applied to the exploration of extraterrestrial materials so the
environmental disasters that occurred through the commercial activities performed on
Earth do not occur in space.
Article 7
Article 7 of the MA makes a recognizable improvement, in comparison to Article
IX of the OST, on the environmental obligations to be held by States Parties when
conducting activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies. Article 7 (1) reads:
1. In exploring and using the moon, States Parties shall take measures to prevent
the disruption of the existing balance of its environment whether by
introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful contamination
through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise. States
Parties shall also take measures to avoid harmfully affecting the environment
of the earth through the introduction of extraterrestrial matter or otherwise.
This article takes measures to avoid harmfully affecting the celestial bodies existing
environment and the environment of Earth through the introduction of extraterrestrial
matter. The MA moves away from the sci-lab perception and provides a scientific
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classification of “disruption”, based on ecological principles.84 The definition brings
awareness to the value of the Moon’s environment and a need to protect that environment
not only for the safety of mankind on the Moon but the protection of the Earth-Moon
relationship and the safety of mankind on Earth. The Moon’s environment is inert and
bringing in hazardous material could potential damage the environment. A committee
assigned to reviewing and approving activities performed by State Parties would bring
attention to any activity that could cause potential harm, thereby reducing damages to the
environment and protecting it for future scientific explorations. Though the article does
amplify the environmental obligation it still contains vagueness of terms. The term
‘harmful contamination’ is not specific on the types of activities that should be restricted
in order to prevent contamination. The article does not provide particular measures
should a State bring in harmful contamination nor a consultative procedure to discuss
what steps are needed to clean up or minimize further damage.85 It should also be noted
that “the period within which the environmental protection measures have to be taken is
not mentioned explicitly” nor the awareness to other State Parties should the damage
affect more than one State’s activity, “as dangerous material may cross frontiers.”86
Article 7 (2) advises States Parties to notify the Secretary General of the United
Nations of the measures being adopted by Article 7 (1) and to notify him in advance of
all placements of radioactive materials on the Moon and the purpose for such placement.
While the MA allows radioactive materials on the Moon; the OST in Article IV prohibits
the placement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in space or on a
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celestial body. It may be argued a radio-active material could be deemed as a weapon of
mass destruction depending on its use and function in a space activity. A chunk of
uranium or the use of helium-3 when combined with other elements can produce a
weapon of mass destruction. The vagueness of terms within Article 7 doesn’t specify
specific restrictions in terms of radioactive materials. While advance notice is necessary
for placement of radioactive materials the effect of this advance notice is weakened, since
it need only be given “to the maximum extent feasible.”87 The mere idea of bringing in
radioactive materials on the Moon without a period within which to notify the Security
General or a procedure that requires particulars about the purpose of such placements
could lead to misuse of the elements. It is important to recall the space-faring nations,
such as U.S., China and Russia, have not signed this agreement and are not held to the
terms of the agreement. If radioactive materials are not deemed as weapons of mass
destruction then either one of these parties could bring in radioactive material and use it
for their own purposes, as long as they abide by the rules set forth in the OST.
Article 11
One of the main reasons State Parties, like U.S. and Russia, did not sign the MA
was due to the term ‘common heritage for all mankind’ found in Article 11 (1) as
opposed to ‘province for all mankind’ found in Article I (1) of the OST.88 The term
‘common heritage’ implies benefit sharing of the natural resources found on the Moon to
all States, regardless of their direct or indirect efforts, whereas, the province of all
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mankind concept allows State Parties to freely explore and use outer space without an
obligation to share the benefits derived from their space activities. The MA proclaims
both concepts, the province of all mankind concept in Article 4 (1), and the common
heritage for all mankind concept in Article 11 (1). By the use of both terms the MA
conveys that while exploration and use fall under the province of all mankind concept,
Article 4 (1), the exploitation of natural resources falls under the common heritage of
mankind concept, Article 11 (1).89 The common heritage of mankind presumes any
exploitative activities – especially commercial – require the consent of all States.90 States
would only be allowed to undertake commercial activities as long as an international
regime (caretaker) would see to it that all States, especially developing countries, would
benefit from those activities.91 If the space-faring nations signed the agreement then they
would be required to share the benefits derived from their exploitative activities.
On Earth developing countries have the option to barter minerals that are abundant in
their land; they have some negotiation rights. On the Moon most developing countries
will never be able to partake in the exploitation activities that developed countries are
previed too. Article 11 (5) establishes an international regime to govern the exploitation
of outer space resources when such exploitation is about to become feasible. According
to legal scholars the establishment of the MA was due to the apparently imminent
possibility to exploit and use the nature resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies
in a commercial manner.92 States Parties may not want an international authority
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governing their mining or exploitation activities because it would mean they would be
obligated to report on their findings, share the benefit of their findings with all, and it
would be less probable for them to make a profit.
The MA provisions do provide a step forward in the ruling of natural resources on
the Moon and other celestial bodies; however, the interpretation of said provisions still
causes great controversy on whether the MA allows extracted materials from the Moon’s
subsurface to be owned and exploited by State Parties. As stated above in Article 6 (2)
the MA explicitly allows the removal of samples from the Moon. Virgiliu Pop quotes
Peter Haanappel’s, “the MA remains silent on the question of ownership of such samples
removed from the Moon, concluding once removed [the sample] becomes the property of
the collecting State, which is under the obligation to use it in accordance with the terms
of Article VI (2) [in the OST].”93 Pop declares the MA provides no specific definition of
the term scientific research and how that would differ from commercial usage.94
According to David R. Criswell there is a “blurring of scientific usage in the ‘lunar
sample research’ meaning and in the industrial meaning, as scientific usage might
comprise the use of extraterrestrial materials to develop new commercial processes.”95
Furthermore, Carl Christol’s belief, which coincides with the argument of this paper, is
the extent and nature of using natural resources for scientific research will become “farranging [and] will allow for very substantial uses of natural resources.”96
Another debatable consideration can be found in Article 11 (3) which declares:
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3. “Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or
natural resources in place shall become property of any State, international
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or
non-governmental entity or of any natural person……”
If the phrase “or natural resource in place” were removed from the paragraph above then
the basic principle of prohibiting a claim of sovereignty on the surface or subsurface of
the Moon or any part thereof has already been instituted by the OST in Article II. The
addition of the reference causes concern over the true meaning behind the paragraph.
The main point of the paragraph focuses on the natural resources of the Moon and
placement of said resources. Fabio Tronchetti considers “the terminology natural
resources in place” was inserted to indicate that the prohibition against assertion of
property rights would not apply to natural resources once removed from their original
position through exploitation.97 In layman’s terms, once a mineral has been extracted
from its place of origin (i.e. mining), then ownership can be claimed and exploitation of
that mineral can be carried out by any State. His thought was in agreement with the U.S.
official position on the provision as expressed by Delegate Hosenball in 1979, “there is
no limit upon the rights of State Parties of those natural resources found on celestial
bodies as are appropriate for the support of their mission and that this may well promote
the commercial or practical exploitation of the natural resources on a celestial body.”98 If
no limit is placed on the amount of extraterrestrial resources removed and an agreement
exists that the wording of the article promotes exploitation activities, then the
environmental damages that have been described above will likely occur on the celestial
bodies. The Moon is inert and its resources are finite and non-replenishing. Allowing
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exploitation without a system in place to manage resource extraction and consumption
will lead to terrestrial disruption of the existing balance causing some areas to undergo a
change that is permanent.
The MA does declare to establish an international regime when exploitation
becomes feasible. The provisions of the international regime can be found in Article 11,
(5-8). Based on the arguments within this paper and those proclaimed by legal scholars
the feasibility of exploitation arrived, and thereby the need to establish an international
regime is apparent. The problem with the creation of such a regime is that none of the
space-faring nations will be liable to the provisions of this agreement, so how successful
would such a regime be in managing exploitation, extraction or consumption of outer
space resources? It has been argued that though a moratorium clause is present in the MA
such resources have already been vested in mankind and the establishment of such a
regime will not force those owners to give up the said resources.99 Another opinion is
since space-faring nations have not signed this agreement then exploitation of such
extracted materials may happen prior to the establishment of such a regime.100 The
original basis for this article was that all State Parties, including the major space-faring
nations, would be Party to this agreement so that the international regime would be
designed to serve the interests and of all, regardless of whose exploitation it would
concern.101 Now, it would seem this paragraph is void and the establishment of such an
international regime needs to be done outside this agreement. There are other in-work
space dispute authorities that will be discussed later in this paper. It should be noted, a
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State Party is most likely to start exploitation of such resources as soon as economically
feasible. Recall certain rare elements, like Helium-3, exist on celestial bodies and
allowing such elements to fall into a State Party’s hand without an environmental
protocol to set principles for the usage and amounts could create costly legal challenges
and affect a nation’s security or economy. To mitigate and even prevent these issues an
environmental protocol and an international regime must be established.
3.4

Law of the Sea Convention
The two common terrestrial examples used to provide guidance for the

establishment of provisions on non-sovereign areas are the ocean and Antarctica. The
ocean has long been proclaimed to be free to all States, except the area along a nation’s
coastline. In the 1940s States began to claim vested interest in discovering ways to utilize
the seas resources near their coastline. As technology developed, the pursuit of resource
exploration moved beyond the coastline region and into the deep sea. When the value of
worth on sea resources, like oil, metals and fish set in, States began to find ways to
exploit the available resources in order to turn a profit. As a result, new issues relating to
the non-sovereign nature of the sea, its resources, and the environment began to form
which led the community of States to establish the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).102 Though the establishment for the convention started
in 1982 the agreement did not entered into force until 1994. Article 136 of the
Convention declares the area, defined as the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof,
and resources as common heritage of mankind. The common heritage concept described
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by Article 136 is the same terminology used in the Moon Agreement (MA). Recall the
MA has not been signed by the major space-faring nations. The UNCLOS took nearly
twelve years to enter into force. This was largely due to the impossibility of reaching an
agreement between the developed and developing States on how to interpret the benefit
sharing of exploited resources.103 The major debates were over Article 140 and 144.104
The authority set forth by the convention would be responsible for ensuring equitable
sharing of financial and economic benefits that were derived from activities within a
given area. Any new technology developments or scientific knowledge obtained by
activities performed within an area would also be given to the authority so it could
promote and encourage the transfer of such knowledge to developing states for the
purpose of benefiting all Parties. Developed States are more likely to partake in
exploration activities leading to the development of new technologies compared to a
developing State that doesn’t have the resources or financial ability to invest in
technology improvements. It seems the favor is in the developing State. In most cases a
developed State is not willing to transfer an advanced technology whether it’s to a
developing State or developed State. It could be argued that the transfer of technology to
another developed State poses security risks. The idea of equally sharing resources and
technology is not a favored choice. This position has been stated in the debates on the
common heritage concept within the MA.
The United States did not sign the draft convention of the UNCLOS that was
opened for signature in 1982. According to Tronchetti, “the U.S. considered the legal
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regime proposed in Part XI to be detrimental to its political and economic interests and an
obstacle to the development of seabed resources.”105 The U.S. had already begun
exploitation of oil in the Gulf of Mexico prior to the establishment of this convention and
did not agree with the provisions stated in Article 140 and 144. The Convention seemed
to lack protection for those developed States that had already begun exploitation and
made substantial investments in sea bed mining prior to 1982.106 Two years earlier the
U.S. Congress enacted the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resource Act on June 28, 1980.
The U.S. proclaimed the exploitation of sea resources was needed in order to maintain a
supply of minerals in case industrial needs exceeded the domestic sources of supply. The
act encourages exploitation of sea resources and provides licenses to those citizens
wishing to partake in exploitation activities. This is a classic example of events driving
policy, as exploitation activities started many years before the international draft
convention on the law of the sea.
As stated above the UNCLOS entered into force in 1994; however, to this date
the U.S. has not ratified the convention. This state of affairs describes a great example of
a sovereign area establishing a convention which opens the door to global exploitation;
however one major State player, the U.S., who is involved in such exploitive activities,
chooses not to sign it. This same state of affairs can be projected in outer space
exploration and exploitation. The MA does establish provisions on exploitation; however,
the common heritage concept is once again shown to be unfavorable to many developed
State Parties and as a result they have chosen not to sign the agreement. Developed
105
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States that have the means to exploit in space could do so freely and may create their own
exploitation act that suits their interests, as we’ve seen with the UNCLOS. Before such an
act is established it is necessary to create an environmental protocol that is attractive to
all State Parties so that resource consumption and environmental protection can be the
fore focus before exploitation activities occur.
3.5

Antarctic Treaty
The exploration history on the continent of Antarctica is an interesting one. The

first claim of land ownership on Antarctica was made by the United Kingdom in 1908.107
Soon following were the claims of land ownership by six other States (New Zealand,
France, Norway, Australia, Argentina and Chile) between the years of 1924 and 1940.
Even before the first official land claim was announced, explorers from other countries,
the U.S., Soviet and Belgium, had been navigating the land as far back as 1818.108 While
the seven States mentioned above do have territorial claims in the area, the remaining
three do not own and have not recognized a claim to the area. Figure 5 below illustrates
the territorial claims by the seven States broken down by degree sectors. It is interesting
to note that some claims, like Argentina and the United Kingdom, are overlapping.
Even though these claims exist it is important to note they are not recognized by
other States. In order to formally make a territorial acquisition certain pre-conditional
terms must be met. Under international law, sovereignty can be acquired when real and
effective possessions take place; a formal declaration of claim by itself is not sufficient
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Figure 5: Territorial claims in Antarctica.109

to consummate the process of sovereign appropriation.110 A State must occupy the land
and then submit to international law the claim to acquire sovereignty. The land must be
unoccupied and international law must approve of the manner and the means of a State’s
occupation.111 To summarize, acquiring sovereignty is a legal condition acquired by a
State through a legal process.112 The assessment of each State’s claims is complex and
the acts or circumstances deemed to be sufficient to claim ownership vary with each case.
A comprehensive analysis for each claim clearly shows an argument for and against the
legality of each claim.113 For the sake of international cooperation and timing of events,
such as the recent ending of the Second World War and the International Geophysical
Year (IGY) of 1957-1958, the seven claimant States and five non-claimant States agreed
to put off the disputes over sovereignty on the continent, at least for the duration of the
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Antarctic Treaty. The disputes were neutralized by means of Article IV in the Antarctic
Treaty which declares that nothing contained within the Treaty shall be interpreted as a
renunciation of or to previous claims of territorial sovereignty or prejudicing the voice of
diplomatic convictions on the matter or assessment of new claims or enlargement of an
existing claim while the Treaty is in force. The provisions contained in Article IV assure
the sovereignty claim made by each of the seven States’ is preserved. To this day Article
IV has proven to be demonstratively effective in suspending sovereignty disputes and
stabilizing the Treaty regime.
Exploitation activities in Antarctica can be traced back to the 1860s. Antarctic
whaling became popular when man discovered oil could be derived from the thick
coating, known as fat or blubber, of a whale. When the first Antarctic land station opened
in 1904 the activity grew and within three years the Antarctic whaling produced more oil
than the rest of the world’s whaling activities put together.114 The increase in whaling
activity without strict controls led to depopulation in several whale species, such as the
blue whale. A total of 282,903 blue whales were caught between 1925 and 1963. Like
many other areas of terrestrial exploitation, the history of Antarctic whaling is a “repeated
story of discovery, overexploitation and collapse.”115
As land exploration activities increased in Antarctica others States became more
aware of Antarctica’s value. Soon States began to establish research facilities and, as
mentioned above, States began to lay certain claim to specific territories. Agreed to
collaborations eventually led those twelve States to participate in extensive research
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programs and together they established several scientific research stations across the
continent. In an effort to support scientific research the twelve states participated in
several consultation meetings; each meeting leading up to the development of today’s
Antarctic Treaty. The international Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1, 1959,
and entered into force on June 23, 1961.116 The treaty has been in force for over fifty
years and continues to be a major bench mark in international law. Today there are five
different treaties governing the activities in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty regime is
seen as one of the most successful regimes in international law as it has made possible the
ability to transform a once disputed terrain into “a natural reserve, devoted to peace and
science.”117
The Antarctic Treaty in part served as a model for the development of the OST.
Similar principles found in the OST can be traced back to the Antarctic Treaty; principles
such as the utilization of the Moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, the
prohibitions of placing objects carrying nuclear weapons in orbit around Earth, the
freedom of scientific research and the promotion of international cooperation.118 The
Antarctic Treaty, like the OST, serves as a foundation, allowing for principles that were
regarded as general to be further developed. The solution of specific problems, like
mineral exploitation and environment controls required a separate formulation and
needed specific legal attention to guide their development path.
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The Antarctic Treaty, like the OST, contains no provisions on mineral
exploitation. The absence of such activity is not surprising because prior to the creation
of either doctrine the idea of mineral exploitation may have been thought of, but due to
the harsh environment of both places the technology required to perform such activities
had not been developed. During the creation of the Antarctic Treaty mineral exploration
was not financially viable due to the lack of mining technology and insufficient
geological data to show prime areas suitable for mining activities. It was not until the
1970s when the first discussions on utilizing Antarctica’s mineral resources were
conducted. The Consultative States set forth and adopted the following recommendation
during their Seventh Consultative Meeting, “Recognizing that mineral exploration is
likely to raise problems of an environmental nature and that the Consultative Parties
should assume responsibility for the protection of the environment and the wise use of
resources.”119 A few years following, the Consultative States took a decision to establish
a moratorium on any activities relating to the exploitation of mineral resources until an
international legal regime was established that would adequately regulate mining
activities and provide proper provisions to protect the Antarctic environment and
ecological systems dependent on it.120 The Eleventh Consultative Meeting held in
Buenos Aires in 1981 established the main principles from which such a regime should
be derived.121 Consultative meetings were held and conducted by the Consultative States.
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To qualify as a Consultative State, a State had to be one of the original twelve signatures
to the Antarctic Treaty or conducted substantial research in the Antarctic region. By
default, only industrialized States were members of the Consultative Party. Any decision
making, including the creation of new legal doctrines, on Antarctica were to be
conducted by the Consultative Party. When the establishment of a new mineral resource
regime began, developing countries raised a flag and started asking the Consultative
States to take into consideration their interests and to share with them the benefits to be
derived from those resources. When the Consultative States said no, the developing
countries brought the issue to the United Nations.122 The United Nations then declared
the utilization of Antarctica belonged to the international community and therefore a new
international regime should be created to reflect that approach.123
In an attempt to satisfy all new parties involved the United Nations, Consultative
States and developing countries worked through the complexity of the topic and began
negotiations. Negotiations took until 1988 to adopt the Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctica Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA). Surprisingly, the Convention
allowed exploitation of Antarctica’s resources but only to the agreed measures set forth
by the Convention’s principles. One principle excluded mineral exploitation activities in
certain regions of Antarctica, such as the deep seabed and declared no mineral resource
activity was allowed to take place until it was evaluated based upon assessment of its
possible impact to the Antarctic environment.124 Further, the Convention established
institutions: an Antarctic Resource Commission, an Advisory Committee and a
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Regulatory Committee. Each committee would be given an allotment of time to assess
and give recommendations with regard to mineral exploration in a given area. After
further evaluation of CRAMRA’s principles it was clear the text of CRAMRA provided
way more detailed regulations on mineral exploration than any current outer space treaty.
The adoption of the CRAMRA was headed for success until 1989. Two State
Parties, Australia and France, withdrew their support after environmental groups began to
speak out on the potential environmental damages that would result once exploitation in
Antarctica was allowed. Since the Convention required ratification by sixteen States in
order to enter into force and with the withdrawal of two major State players the fate of
CRAMRA soon ended. Australia and France declared the development of mineral
resources within Antarctica would be detrimental to its environment. Further pressure
came from non-governmental organizations that wished to ban mining in Antarctica and
declare it a World Park. 125 France and Australia began working negotiations for a
convention to preserve and protect Antarctica’s environment while a delegation from
Chile proposed to strengthen the functions and powers of the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meetings. 126 After years of negotiations the States Parties finally reached a
decision and adopted the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty in
1998.127
Key provisions within the Protocol are found in Article II, III and VII. Article II
commits the Parties to a comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and
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designates Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.128 Article III
assures activities in Antarctica are planned and conducted based on prior assessments of,
and informed judgments about, their possible impacts to the Antarctic environment and
dependent and associated ecosystems.129 The same Article includes a list of judgments
that shall be taken into account when assessing the activities impact to the environment.
An overview includes: 1) scope of activity, including duration and intensity; 2)
cumulative impact of the activity; 3) assessment if the activity will detrimentally affect
any other activity in the Antarctic Treaty area; 4) whether technology and procedures are
available to provide environmentally safe operations; 5) an existing capacity to monitor
key environmental parameters and provide early warning of adverse effects of the activity
and 6) an existing capacity to respond promptly and effectively to accidents, particularly
those with potential environmental effects.130 Lastly, and probably the most important
principle is contained in Article VII which prohibits any activity relating to mineral
resources, other than scientific research.131 This Protocol bans all commercial mineral
resource activity and prohibits exploitation and mining of Antarctica’s mineral resources
unless for scientific research. The one difference between the latter sentence in this
Article and the OST is the Protocol establishes a committee to assess and agree to any
activity relating to mineral resources. Neither the OST nor the MA have established such
a committee. Mining in Antarctica, unlike outer space, is a controlled option even if a
State declares it’s for scientific research.
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The regulations set out in the Environmental Protocol are mandatory and legally
binding on all of the signatory Parties. Never before had Nations agreed to such a
comprehensive and stringent set of rules to protect the environment of a whole continent.
It’s interesting to note that it took a total of 28 years from the first discussions in 1970 on
mineral exploitation activities within Antarctica to 1998 when a resolution was reached.
If the same calculations were applied to the OST from the date the treaty was adopted,
then in 1995 there should have been an agreement on mineral exploitation activities in
outer space. Unfortunately, such an agreement has not been reached. As mentioned in
the previous chapter’s outer space mining activities are winding up and though
Antarctica’s terrestrial environment is different than the extraterrestrial environmental in
outer space, there is still a need to protect and preserve the outer space environment.
The environmental protection and preserve model found within Antarctica’s
Environmental Protocol and the six annexes contained within it will be the basis for
developing a protocol on environmental protection to the OST found in Part Six.
3.6

Case Study on Prior Appropriation
The “State of Wyoming vs. State of Colorado” is a terrestrial non-international

case ruling on prior appropriation of water rights.132 The ruling on prior appropriation in
this case is an analogy to the commercial utilization of extraterrestrial mineral rights for
the benefit of a State Party as opposed to an equitable apportionment of the mineral
between States on the basis of equitable rights. The state of Wyoming brought forward a
claim against the state of Colorado for its attempt to divert the Laramie River. Both States
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have adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation133 on water rights. The Laramie River
flows through both States; each State has equivalent jurisdiction to the river, so the laws
of state sovereignty and interstate stream were argued. The diversion of the Laramie
River as Colorado had intended would upset the water rights of Wyoming. In accordance
with the prior appropriation rights, the first person to use a quantity of water from a
source for a beneficial use has the right to continue using that source as long as it’s for
the same intended purpose. Subsequent users can use the remaining water for their own
beneficial purposes provided that they do not impinge on the rights of previous users.
Prior appropriation is based on “first in time, first in right” principle. The rights of
a prior appropriator are especially active in the time of water deficiency. The intent of
Colorado’s diversion system on the Laramie River would take water outside the
watershed where it would have been impossible to return it to the stream, thus going
against the vested rights of other prior appropriation states. The impact would have left
thousands in Wyoming without irrigation means to water their acres. In addition, the
short in water flow would be injurious to sister States. The court ruled on equity over the
prior appropriation doctrine as the means to divide the flow of the Laramie River between
two states in an equitable manner. The court ruled in favor of Wyoming on a prior
appropriation date and therefore denied Colorado’s attempt on the division of the
Laramie River.
This case is an example of an “I” mentality where one State wishes to divert a
resource flow for the benefit of their needs without due regard to the cause and effect
133
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impacts it would have on other States. Wyoming and Colorado have equivalent
jurisdiction to the same resource. Luckily, for Wyoming and Colorado, a system was in
place to assess resource usage and its effect to other States and their environment. In the
terrestrial example, the capacity of the shared source is examined first before the allotted
amounts are dispersed. Such a system does not exist in outer space. All State Parties to
the OST have equivalent jurisdiction to space resources, yet unlike the terrestrial
example, there is no established court authority to settle a dispute if one State wishes to
use a resource for their own benefit which in turn causes an inequitable act to other State
Parties. The over usage of one mineral would eventually lead to depletion and could
potentially cause harm to the environment, depended ecosystems or another State Party.
The intent to establish a system for the management of outer space resources would be to
preserve the resources and protect the environment. Though Article I (1) of the OST
declares equitable rights to the exploration and use of outer space to all States irrespective
of their degree of economic or scientific development, it provides no guidance on the
details of how a developing State or even a space-faring State would receive the benefits
prescribed by another State. Commercial or scientific uses of minerals without an
oversight committee assessing its impact to the environment and proper consumption
would leave State Parties to consume outer space resources without due regard to
resource rationing and turn an unmanaged and ungoverned frontier into an environmental
disaster. The ending result would leave both the private and government worlds without a
potential return of investment, whether that return be to benefit science or commercial
endeavors.
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PART FOUR
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The current legal doctrines, the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement,
governing outer space activities include limited provisions on space resource utilization
in terms of excavation and consumption. A natural resource can be extracted from its
place of origin with limited restriction on the quantity and method of use. Part 2 provides
a summary of the resources found on the Moon. Recall that the Moon is rich in
aluminum, iron, silicon, oxygen, hydrogen, chromium, water and other minerals. Each of
these minerals can be used in the development of revolutionary self-sufficient
technologies to prolong mission duration in space. These minerals and volatiles can be
manufactured in-space to be used in many of the following areas: propellant systems on
robotic and human vehicles, water production for life support systems, fabrication of
structures, and production for a new energy source. The goal for significant technology
development is to sustain human presence on the surface of the Moon through affordable
measures; those measures will be achieved through utilizing in situ resources thus
reducing mission costs by removing large amounts of mass from each mission
destination.
The most valuable resources contained on the Moon are water and Helium-3.
Water will have an enormous impact in terms of usage in propellant and life-support
operations for a crewed mission. Utilizing water ice on the Moon removes a significant
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amount of space and weight a typical launch vehicle would carry. Water is the
fundamental building block to food and hygiene and will be essential for carrying out
long duration manned missions. Robotic exploration missions to the Moon have proven
water ice exists at the lunar poles and in certain craters located near the north and south
poles. However, not so clear is how much water ice exists and how much water ice would
be required to sustain one or multiple life support systems on the Moon. Depending on
international collaboration amongst certain State Parties multiple life support systems
may be required. Depending on its abundance in quantity this resource may be a high
value target. Helium-3 is also another high value target for consumption. Scientific
research reveals Helium-3 when fused with other minerals, such as deuterium, has the
potential to be used as a fuel in fusion reactors. Scientists believe it has the potential to
replace fossil fuels and be a primary source of energy on Earth. Since Helium-3 is rare on
Earth but abundant on the Moon this mineral also becomes a high value target.
The possibilities to explore and use outer space for commercial and scientific
research purposes have raised several legal questions regarding if and to what extent
ownership over outer space resources is contained and allowed under the existing space
law regime. Part three provided a comprehensive analysis on articles within the existing
space law regime that pertained to the acquisition of ownership rights over space
resources. The analysis concludes mineral resource ownership in terms of total
consumption or extraction is a realistic possibility to both private and public participants.
Private participants show the distinct possibility of participation in resource exploitation
as oppose to public participants showing participation in resources consumption, leading
to ownership, for scientific and technology developments. Regardless, of whether the
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participant is public or private utilizing space resources leads to extraction and
consumption of minerals that are finite and non-replenishing.
The ruling on whether the current space law regime allows for exploitation of
space resources is debatable. Review of the analysis performed on the OST in Part 3
concludes space resources can be used for the benefit and interest of all mankind. The
justification on the act to seize materials merely lies within the text of Article 1, the
freedom of exploration and use of outer space by all States. How the resources are used
is not clear cut as analysis shows the term ‘use’ can be defined as a scientific or
commercial activity. Some State Parties to the treaty view ‘use’ as equivalent to
‘exploitation.’ Until the OST can be updated to address clarity and legal certainty of the
term ‘use’ then the right of using outer space resources for exploitation or scientific
investigation is a valid option open to all States. Review of the analysis performed on the
MA in Part 3 holds a slightly different weight as the major space-faring nations have not
signed the treaty. Though the MA has not been signed and ratified by the majority of
State Parties it is still an in-force agreement and thus applicable to space activities
performed by those States that have signed it. In review of the treaty’s provisions the
MA concludes, like the OST, that the exploration and use of the Moon and other celestial
bodies shall be for the benefit and interest of all mankind. The MA provisions do provide
a step forward in the ruling of natural resources on the Moon and other celestial bodies;
however, the interpretation of said provisions still causes great controversy on whether
the MA allows extracted materials from the Moon’s subsurface to be owned and
exploited by State Parties. From the perspective of resource management it can be argued
the provisions in the MA due more harm than good. Recall Article 6 of the MA
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established the consent to remove samples from the Moon to further scientific
investigation and put emphasis on making portions of those samples available to other
interested State Parties. However, the article does not force States to share those samples
it merely insists State Parties shall have “regard” to sharing. This allows a State Party to
choose whether it shares a resource. Recall certain minerals on the Moon may be limited
in quantity available so one healthy heaping could remove all of an available resource.
Article 6 goes on to affirm State Parties may take ‘quantities appropriate’ for the support
of their missions. Since there is no definition on the term ‘quantities appropriate’ it can
be assumed a State may take however much of a resource they deem appropriate.
Too often throughout history the phrase “the ends will justify the means” has been
used as an excuse to pursue first and think about the consequences later. How devastating
have the consequences been, whether intended or unintended? Thomas Gangale in
Boldly Own What No One has Before pronounces, “We are invited to dismantle a legal
structure that has existed for forty years….and erect what in its place?134 The time of
mining and exploiting outer space resources is amongst us and the legal doctrines
governing our activities in space do not provide the necessary provisions to protect the
outer space environment and manage the excavation and consumption of outer space
resources. As new mining technologies arise, both private, commercial and government
industries will be interested in the new investments to be won. As President Kennedy
stated, “Whether it will become a force for good or ill depends on man, and only if the
United States occupies a position of pre-eminence can we help decide whether this new
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ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater of war.”135 Similarly, only we
“the international community” can decide whether exploitation and excavation will be a
sea of peace or a terrifying theater of war.
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PART FIVE
CONCLUSION

History confirms that once a subject has hands on a valuable resource, there
seems to be a general rule that they are entitled to use them according to their purpose
and needs. The clear cutting timber, dust bowl and Antarctic whaling events are all
examples of what happens when resource usage goes unchecked. The OST and MA are
broad in their interpretation of resource usage. No limits to the amount of resource
removal have been placed upon the rights of State Parties. Regardless of the efforts put
forth by a State Party or what the mission definition prescribes, a State Party should not
be able to remove infinite amounts of extraterrestrial resources. The OST and MA also
do not provide an environmental committee to assert environmental damages or protect
the environment from damages caused during resource extraction and consumption.
Furthermore, if all State Parties have the right to use space resources, as deemed by the
OST and MA, then what statues are in place to ensure the resources are divided fairly
among all States? What about the sharing of areas prone to activity or the establishment
of an institute that has been declared the authority in charge with the power to resolve
conflict when it arises? Recall certain rare elements, like Helium-3, exist on the Moon
and allowing such elements to fall into a State Party’s hand without an environmental
protocol to set principles for the usage and amount could create costly legal challenges
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and affect a nation’s security or economy. To mitigate and even prevent these issues an
environmental protocol and an international regime must be established.
There exists great confusion in terminology relating to space activities, and it is
imperative that steps be taken soon in order to arrive at a more standardize use of terms
and expression that are associated with the current space activities. Everything ultimately
depends on the political will of the states concerned. By not addressing the
aforementioned activities of extraction and consumption, State Parties will act first and
think about the consequences after. A quote provided by a commissioned officer in the
US Air Force provides insight on how State Parties will perform without a new legal
framework to ensure proper consumption and extraction of outer space nature resources:
Every State has the same sovereign right as the United States to fully utilize space
for its own socioeconomic development and pursue of its own self interests. If
every state pursues the same U.S. path of unilateral action and opposition of legal
regimes prohibiting or limiting their access or use of space, then ultimately
conflict in space will happen and that conflict is likely to have large detrimental
effects on the use of space by all States.136
Nations are already establishing a legal regime on the purposes of providing licenses to
exploit resources.137
A Convention on Environmental Protection for Outer Space needs to be employed
as well as a committee of specialist that understand the celestial terrain and can mitigate
the risks of extraterrestrial disruption and associated ecosystems. Also, an international
authority is needed when consultations amongst State Parties fail. As more State Parties
become involved in extraction and consumption of mineral resources a court of
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international law needs to be established to allow States to make claims, settle disputes
and provide final rulings on resource utilization. Such an authority has been set up with
similar non-sovereign areas, such as the high seas and Antarctica. Why would outer
space, a place of abundant resources, be treated any different?
In conclusion, in order to ensure peaceful and orderly development of our
planetary bodies while preserving their environment this researcher recommends two
notions: 1) Put into force the Final Draft of the Settlement of Space Law Disputes written
in 1998 to serve as a mechanism for resolving disputes and enforcing them, and 2) Create
a Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Outer Space Treaty utilizing the methods
and provisions set forth by the 1998 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty. The details on both of these notions are outlined in the following
section.
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PART SIX
RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1

International Space Authority
Space and the celestial bodies, except Earth, are the few places not governed by

legal authority. The OST holds States Parties accountable for resolving conflict amongst
themselves through the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance. If a conflict
cannot be resolved then according to the OST the State Party is to request international
consultation.138 At first glance this may seem appealing to some readers as space for
centuries has been sort of a safe haven as no real international conflict has occurred. The
space age has been in an explorative nature for the last several years. If conflict has risen
it’s been over the wording of principles.139 Nowadays, with advancements in technology
countries other than the U.S. and Russia are beginning to launch their own initiatives for
space exploration. While international cooperation amongst all States Parties involved in
space activities has been conveyed in the OST and MA there still lies the chance that an
obligation of good faith maybe overruled by extenuating circumstances. Like in any
sport, once more players are involved in the game there is a higher risk for confrontation
and competiveness. The latter has already been seen in the 1960s space race between the
U.S. and Russia. If both nations had reached the Moon within the same time period then
138
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one could postulate the kinds of heroic events that may have occurred to resume position
over a particular piece of property. Whether an activity takes place at home, work,
nationally or internationally a dispute amongst parties is inevitable. As stated by Frans G.
von der Dunk, “the subject of a dispute settlement is at the heart of every legal system or
subsystem, whether national or international, and in principle it should not be any
different for space law either.”140
The creation of an international authority over space activities has been in
discussion for quite some time. The first initiative on the creation of a settlement for
resolving space disputes occurred in 1978 by the International Law Association (ILA).141
With collaboration between the ILA and the International Institute of Space Law the first
Draft Convention on the Settlement of Space Law Disputes was created in 1982 at the
Sixtieth Conference of the International Law Association held in Montreal.142 The draft
convention incorporated the following basic principles: 1) States Parties should be able to
choose a method for dispute resolution that’s applicable to their specific case, 2) binding
and non-binding settlement methods should be established, especially if a State Party
does not agree to the conclusions of such non-binding methods, 3) methods for dispute
resolution should be provided, 4) obligation to fulfill the decision of the tribunal and 5)
draft of an annex for disputes settlement clause to be served as a model or be included
into future bilateral or multilateral treaties on Space Law.143 The draft Convention
follows to some degree the dispute settlement of the Law of the Sea Convention. The
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three methods presented in the convention for dispute resolutions were conciliation,
arbitration and the International Court of Justice. The dispute parties could be sovereign
States, intergovernmental organizations (i.e. NATO) or private entities. The convention
considered government or non-government agencies to be under the States Parties to the
treaty. Overall, the draft convention seemed to contain the necessary mechanisms to
move it forward with adoption. According the proceedings a final draft was to be
brought forward at the 1986 ILA Conference. 144 However, various views over the
dispute mechanisms and the growth of using outer space for commercial purposes led to
more changes and in 1998 at the Sixty-Eighth Conference of the ILA in Taipei the
discussion of the Final Draft of the Revised Convention on the Settlement of Disputes
Related to Space Activities took place.145 The Final Draft Convention was not adopted
during this conference and has yet to be adopted. It’s clear a few issues relating to
disputes with private entities have not been worked out; however, the ILA clearly has the
expertise to put forth a successful convention and the notion of creating a new
mechanism when one already exists is preposterous.
This thesis recommends the following: 1) put forth the creation of the
international space settlement system created by the ILA and 2) amendment the OST to
include the dispute mechanism with the power to resolve and enforce judgment when
cooperation, negotiation and consultation of international disputes among States Parties
fail.
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6.2

Environmental Protocol to the Outer Space Treaty
The Moon is a satellite to our planet that few of us will ever visit but whose

continued health we all depend on. The Earth to Moon system is vital to our very
existence and is the key to understanding our universe and the history of our planet’s
creation. The Moon and the celestial bodies are important to science because they teach
us about past, present and future being of Earth. The study and research of the celestial
bodies leads to an understanding of how a planet works. Extracting and consuming
resources from a planet’s surface is needed to continue the pursuit of planetary science;
however, such science could not continue if such resources were depleted or disruption to
the environment caused an adverse change to its existing balance. It is lackadaisical to
put the determining factor of whether the existing balance of the space environment has
been disrupted solely on States especially since a State has no duty to consult if it
believes its activity may cause disruption.146
The space environment is remote, hostile and uninhabited; it very much resembles
the environment of Antarctica. Antarctica has adopted a protocol to enhance the
protection of its environment and its dependent and associated ecosystems. States Parties
to the OST should be no different in ensuring protection of the space environment. This
protocol is not meant to hinder scientific exploration; it’s meant to preserve the
environment and its valuable resources by ensuring the first come, first serve mentality of
mankind doesn’t lead to terrestrial disruption, delete non-replenishing resources, and
destroy international cooperation. By acknowledging that the Moon offers a unique place
146
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for conducting scientific research, sustaining manned presence, and furthering technology
development then there should be no objection to protecting this asset through the
creation of an environmental protocol.
The utilization of space resources is applicable to other areas where extraction and
consumption of resources under exceptional circumstances has become an issue.
Therefore the basis for the creation of an environmental protocol for outer space will be
similar to the principles used in the 1998 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty. A Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Outer Space Treaty
should contain the following elements:
1. The protocol would be written in such a manner that does not override, modify or
amend the OST. The creation of the protocol would be a legal doctrine to
supplement the OST as with other space doctrines like the Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects, and Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space.
2. The Protocol would require an environmental impact assessment of all activities
before they are allowed to continue. Activities would be planned and conducted
on the basis of information sufficient to allow prior assessment of, and informed
judgments about, their possible impacts to the space environment and dependent
and associated ecosystems. An activity would be modified, suspended or
cancelled if it resulted or threatened the space environment or dependent and
associated ecosystems. The following attributes would be provided and assessed:
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a. The scope of the activity, including its area, duration and intensity;
b. The cumulative impacts of the activity, both by itself and in combination
with other activities in the outer space area;
c. Whether the activity will detrimentally affect another activity in the outer
space area;
d. Whether there exists the capacity to monitor key environmental
parameters and ecosystem components so as to identify and provide early
warning of any adverse effects of the activity and provide such
modification of operating procedures as may be necessary;
e. Whether there exists the capacity to respond promptly and effectively to
accidents, particularly those with potential environmental effects;
3. The Parties to the Protocol would co-operate in the planning and conducting of
activities in the space environment. Particular co-operation would exist among
those States Parties whose activities would potentially impact the activity of
another State Party. Each State Party would be responsible for the following:
a. Provide appropriate assistance to other Parties in the preparation of
environmental impact assessments;
b. Provide to other Parties upon request information relevant to any potential
environmental risk and assistance to minimize the effects of accidents
which may damage the space environment or dependent and associated
ecosystems;
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c. Consult with other Parties with regard to the choice of sites for prospective
stations and other facilities so as to avoid the cumulative impacts caused
by the excessive concentration in any location;
d. Where appropriate, undertake joint expeditions and share the use of
stations and other facilities
e. Carry out such steps as may be agreed upon at Outer Space Consultative
Meetings.
4. The establishment of a Committee for Environmental Protection. Each State Party
would be entitled to be a member of the Committee and would appoint a
representative who may be accompanied by experts and advisers in the space
environment field. Observer status in the Committee would be opened to any
Contracting Party to the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Agreement which is not a
Party to the Protocol. The Committee may also invite such other relevant
scientific, environmental and technical organizations which can contribute to its
work to participate as observers at its sessions. The Committee shall represent a
report on each of its sessions. The report would cover all matters considered at the
session and reflect all views expressed. The report would be circulated to all
States Parties to the Protocol, the observers attending the session, and would
thereupon be made publicly available.
5. The Committee for Environmental Protection would be responsible for the
environmental assessment of activities prior to their commencement. The
assessment would fall into three categories; (a) less than a minor impact; (b) a
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minor impact; or (c) more than a minor impact. The ideal is to have a
representative from each Party and their associated experts and advisors in the
space environment field to assess each activity and determine the path forward
depending on the assessment impact outcome.
6. Waste storage, disposal and removal from the outer space environment, as well as
recycling and source reduction, would be essential considerations in planning and
conducting of activities in outer space. Waste would be removed to the maximum
extent practicable and be returned with the country from which the activities
generating the waste were organized. Past and present waste disposal sites on land
and abandoned work site on celestial bodies shall be cleaned up by the generator
of such waste.
7. A State Party or States Parties that undertake activities resulting in harm to the
space environment, human life or another Party’s equipment and/or facilities
would be liable to pay the costs of response action taken by the other Parties,
should they fail to take prompt and effective response action, and be liable to pay
the cost of damages done to Parties involved. The timeframe and amount for such
payable costs will be determined by the dispute mechanism described below.
8. The Committee for Environmental Protection would be responsible for ensuring
the preservation of outer space resources by setting forth rules on the reasonable
amount of mineral extraction. These rules would be in agreement with the
principles for environmental protection set forth by the Protocol.
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9. Disputes arising among Parties from the interpretation or application of the
Protocol would, at the request of any of one of them, consult among themselves as
soon as possible with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation,
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful
means to which the parties to the dispute agree. Each Party, when signing,
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Protocol, or at any time
thereafter, may choose, by written declaration, one or both of the following means
for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this
Protocol when conciliation among Parties fails, (a) International Court of Justice;
or (b) the Arbitral Tribunal.
a. A Party which has not made a declaration shall be deemed to have
accepted to the competence of the Arbitral Tribunal;
b. If Parties to a dispute have not accepted the same means for the settlement
dispute, the dispute may be submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal, unless the
parties otherwise agree.
This thesis recommends a Protocol on Environmental Protection to the OST be
established immediately and include the principles set forth above. This will lead to
peaceful and orderly exploration and development of our celestial bodies.
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